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Abstract
Identifying features that leak information about sensitive attributes is a key challenge in
the design of information obfuscation mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a framework to
identify information-leaking features via information density estimation. Here, features whose
information densities exceed a pre-defined threshold are deemed information-leaking features.
Once these features are identified, we sequentially pass them through a targeted obfuscation
mechanism with a provable leakage guarantee in terms of Eγ-divergence. The core of this
mechanism relies on a data-driven estimate of the trimmed information density for which we
propose a novel estimator, named the trimmed information density estimator (TIDE). We then
use TIDE to implement our mechanism on three real-world datasets. Our approach can be used
as a data-driven pipeline for designing obfuscation mechanisms targeting specific features.
1 Introduction
A challenging problem in dataset and information sharing platforms is limiting the leakage of sensi-
tive or private information. Sensitive information leakage can be controlled by obfuscating samples
in a dataset prior to disclosure; i.e., perturbing the sample in a way that sensitive information
cannot be effectively inferred [1–4]. Samples may contain several features, only some of which
might leak information about sensitive attributes. For example, not all areas in a facial image
equally disclose emotion (as a sensitive attribute), and not all terms used in Tweets equally reveal
a user’s political preference. Given a set of sensitive attributes, an information obfuscation mech-
anism should ideally target only those features of the data that leak excessive amount of sensitive
information. Such mechanisms usually achieve higher utility (e.g., the quality of the image) by
incorporating either complete (cf. information-theoretic privacy [5–10]) or partial (cf. generative
adversarial privacy [3, 11]) knowledge of the underlying data distribution.
In this paper, we propose a data-driven information-obfuscation mechanism. As a natural first
step, we identify the information-leaking features in the data via an information-theoretic quantity
called the information density [12,13]. This quantity is at the heart of most information-theoretic
measures of privacy [6–8] as well as differential privacy (DP) [14–19]. Intuitively, the information
density captures the change of the belief about a sensitive attribute upon an observation of a sample
in a disclosed dataset.
Features whose information density are above a certain threshold (which we call information-
leaking features) can be randomized (e.g., perturbed) via an obfuscation mechanism. The goal of
the obfuscation mechanism is to limit unwanted inferences about a sensitive attribute from disclosed
data. We argue that this objective can be mathematically formulated in terms of a specific type of
f -divergence [20], called the Eγ-divergence, which captures the tail distribution of the information
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density. We propose a feature-dependent Gaussian mechanism that ensures obfuscation in terms
of Eγ-divergence by targeting only the information-leaking features.
The methodology proposed here aims to develop a theoretical foundation for expounding exist-
ing approaches that completely rely on neural networks to identify and obfuscate the information-
leaking features [1–3]. Despite its theoretical nature, our approach has a comparable performance
in terms of sensitive information leakage as [1], without a specific “utility” target having to be
pre-determined by a user. Furthermore, it adds a layer of interpretability, enabling features that
pose an excessive leakage risk to be identified and communicated to the data owner.
In practice, we need to estimate the information density from samples. This estimation problem
is inherently connected to mutual information estimation (since the expected value of information
density is equal to the mutual information) which is known to be challenging [21–23] unless an
adequate parametric model is assumed [24]. The main difficulty lies in the unboundedness of the
information density, which leads to high sample complexity for reliable estimation. However, since
our mechanism perturbs only information-leaking features, it requires the trimmed information
density whose estimation is a much easier task than the original information density estimation
problem. Inspired by [25,26], we develop the trimmed information density estimator (TIDE), based
on the variational representations of f -divergences [25,27].
The contributions of this paper, from theoretical results to practice, are listed as follows:
1. We propose a framework for identifying information-leaking features in terms of the trimmed
information density, and use the Eγ-divergence between the distributions over a sensitive
attribute prior and posterior to observing a disclosed sample to measure the information
leakage. Moreover, we demonstrate that obfuscation mechanisms that aim to minimize the
Eγ-divergence satisfies several desirable properties in terms of information leakage guarantees
(cf. Section 2).
2. We propose an estimator for the trimmed (thresholded) information density, named TIDE,
and derive accompanying consistency and sample complexity guarantees. On the practical
side, we present a neural network-based implementation for the TIDE (cf. Section 3).
3. We apply the obfuscation mechanism in Section 2 for image obfuscation [28–30] with GENKI-
4k [31] and Celebrity Attributes (CelebA) [32] datasets, and for identifying politically-charged
terms in Tweets collected from online media [33] (cf. Section 4). These experiments provide
evidence that the TIDE can potentially serve as a building block in the design of obfuscation
mechanisms.
It is worth mentioning that information obfuscation, being inherently prior-dependent, has
several limitations [11]. In Section 5, we list some of these limitations and together with our final
remarks. Proofs, experimental details, and additional experiments on synthetic data are provided
in the Supplementary Material. Source code for the experiments will be made publicly available
after review.
1.1 Related Work
The problem of balancing the competing objectives of providing meaningful information and infer-
ence from disclosed data, on the one hand, and obfuscating sensitive information, on the other hand,
has been widely studied in information-theoretic privacy [5–9, 34, 35]. Following the information-
theoretic trend, these works exploit average measures (in particular mutual information and its
variants) to obfuscate data. Recently, information obfuscation has been achieved using neural net-
works. For example, in [1], an optimization problem similar to the privacy funnel [36] is formulated
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to train a neural network to automatically obfuscate sensitive information while maintaining utility.
In [2, 3, 11], neural generative models are introduced to generate “privatized” data that resemble
the original data. These works rely on neural networks to select and perturb features, while our
approach is different in the sense that we first identify the information-leaking features using the
information density and apply local obfuscation only on these features.
Our approach of first identifying the information-leaking features and then perturbing those
features is inspired by the instance-based additive mechanism of [37] in the DP setting. In fact,
the information density appears in DP under the name of privacy loss variable [15–19], thereby
connecting DP and information-theoretic quantities, e.g. mutual information DP [38] and Re´nyi
DP [39]. Despite this connection, we emphasize that our approach is fundamentally different from
DP, in that we consider prior distribution on sensitive attributes and also we allow correlation
among features (see, e.g., [40] for the limitations of DP for correlated data).
Estimating information density from samples is connected to density ratio estimation [26,27,41]
— a fundamental task in various applications of machine learning and statistics, including outlier
detection [42], transfer learning [43], and generative adversarial networks [44]. A na¨ıve approach to
determine the density ratio is to use the plug-in estimator, which is known to perform poorly [24]
unless adequate parametric models (e.g., linear [41], kernel [45], or exponential family [26] models)
are assumed. The two closest approaches to the trimmed information density estimation in this
paper are (i) [27], which proposed using the variational representation of f -divergences to convert
information density estimation into an optimization problem over finite-complexity set of functions
and (ii) [26], which estimated the trimmed density ratio of variables from exponential family distri-
butions. We enforce a threshold on the information density when solving the optimization problem
in the variational representation of f -divergences (see Section 3).
1.2 Notation
Capital letters (e.g., X) denote random variables, and calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) denote sets. We
denote the probability measure of X × S by PX,S , the conditional probability measure of S given
X by PS|X , and the marginal probability measure of X and S by PX and PS respectively. We use
PS|X(·|x) and PS|x interchangeably. We represent the fact that X is distributed according to PX by
X ∼ PX . KL-divergence is given by DKL(PS,X‖PSPX) = EPS,X [log(PS,X/PSPX)]. We denote the
realization (i.e., sample) drawn from a probability distribution by x = (x1, · · · , xj , · · · , xm), where
xj is the j
th feature for j = 1, · · · ,m. Similarly, Xj is the jth feature of the data variable. We
denote [k] = [1, · · · , k], xk = [x1, · · · , xk], and (z)+ = max{z, 0} for a scalar z. Finally, Id×d is the
identity matrix of dimension d, and 1{·} is the indicator function.
2 Problem Formulation
We consider the setting where a user wishes to disclose data X (e.g., image, tweet) while controlling
the information revealed about a (correlated) sensitive attribute S (e.g., emotion, political prefer-
ence). The goal is to produce an obfuscated representation Y of X that discloses only negligible
information about S. We assume that X consists of m features, i.e., X = (X1, . . . , Xm), where each
feature takes values in a compact set X . Throughout this section, we assume that (S,X) ∼ PS,X
and the underlying distribution PS,X is given. This restrictive assumption will be dropped in the
subsequent section.
One possible approach to obfuscate X is to independently perturb each feature (e.g., by adding
noise to each pixel of an image). However, in many applications, only a few features of the data are
correlated with the sensitive attribute, rendering adding independent noise highly sub-optimal. In
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this section, we propose an information-theoretic framework for data obfuscation which consists of
two parts: First, we identify information-leaking features, and then obfuscate only those features.
This way, many features need not be perturbed, leading to an improvement in the utility of the
disclosed data.
Our framework relies on an information-theoretic quantity called the information density, a
term coined in [12] and has since been used in numerous applications in information theory and
statistics, particularly in binary hypothesis testing (see, e.g., Neyman-Pearson Lemma [46]).
Definition 1 (Information Density). Given a pair of realization (s, x) of (S,X) ∼ PS,X , the
information density between s and x is defined as
i(s;x) , log PS,X(s, x)
PS(s)PX(x)
= log
PX|S(x|s)
PX(x)
. (1)
Similarly, information density can be defined for each feature xj as
i(s;xj) , log
PS,Xj (s, xj)
PS(s)PXj (xj)
, (2)
and the conditional information density between s and xj given another feature xr as
i(s;xj |xr) , log
PS,Xj |Xr(s, xj |xr)
PS|Xr(s|xr)PXj |Xr(xj |xr)
. (3)
Intuitively, i(s;xj) evaluates the change of belief about s upon observing xj . In particular, if
|i(s;xj)| is small, then xj does not significantly contribute in increasing the belief of an adversary
about s, since PS|X(s|xj) ≈ PS(s). This, however, does not mean that xj can be disclosed “as
is” without incurring an information leakage risk. To see why, consider, for example, that m = 2,
X1 and X2 are independent and uniform binary random variables, and S = X1 + X2 (modulo 2).
Although i(s;x1) = i(s;x2) = 0 for any realization (s, x1, x2) of (S,X1, X2), the release of both x1
and x2 would allow perfect reconstruction of s. To account for such inferences of sensitive attributes,
we consider the conditional information density as a yardstick for identifying information-leaking
features.
Definition 2 (Information-Leaking Feature). Given an observed sample x = (x1, · · · , xm), j ∈ [m],
and ε ≥ 0, the feature xj is said to be an ε-information-leaking feature if there exists a sensitive
attribute s such that |i(s;xj |xj−1)|> ε.
The threshold ε is a tradeoff parameter between information leakage risk and the utility of the
disclosed data (e.g., the quality of an image). Notice that if the data is not equipped with a natural
ordering (e.g., time series), we can choose an arbitrary ordering for the conditioning features xj−1
(cf. Section 4.1 for an example in images).
2.1 A Na¨ıve Obfuscation Mechanism
Given any j ∈ [m], ε ≥ 0, and all features xj−1, define
Bεj (x
j−1) , {x ∈ X : |i(s;xj |xj−1)|> ε for some s ∈ S}. (4)
If xj /∈ Bεj (xj−1), then it can be disclosed “as is” because it cannot be used to infer sensitive
attributes given all the previous features. On the other hand, each feature xj ∈ Bεj (xj−1) is required
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to be obfuscated. To do so, we shall pass all such features sequentially through an obfuscation
mechanisms to ensure that they no longer belong to Bεj (x
j−1).
Consider the mechanisms Mj : X → X such that if xj /∈ Bεj (xj−1) then Mj(xj) = xj (deter-
ministic) and if xj ∈ Bεj (xj−1) then Mj(xj) generates Yj a random variable from a distribution to
be designed. A natural question raised here is: how should information obfuscation be measured?
To answer this question, we introduce the obfuscation metric Pr(|i(s;Yj |yj−1|) > ε) and require
Pr(|i(s;Yj |yj−1|) > ε) ≤ δ
m
, (5)
for all s ∈ S, where yj−1 is any output of the M1(x1), . . . ,Mj−1(xj−1). Although this metric is
intuitive, it presents a serious drawback for use in practice. Any reasonable mechanism must be
immune to post-processing: any processing of the mechanism’s output should only decrease the
information leakage risk or equivalently the obfuscation metric. However, the obfuscation metric
in (5) may violate this property. To see this, let m = 1 and Y˜ be obtained by applying an
arbitrary post-processing to Y the output of the mechanism M1 satisfying the obfuscation metric
Pr(i(Y ; s) > ε) ≤ δ for all s. Immunity to post-processing is then equivalent to requiring
Pr(i(s; Y˜ ) > ε) ≤ Pr(i(s;Y ) > ε), (6)
for all s, ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. However, we show in the following that there must exist some ε for
which (6) is violated. To see this, notice that E
[
P
Y˜ |S(Y˜ |s)
P
Y˜
(Y˜ )
]
= E
[
PY |S(Y |s)
PY (Y )
]
= 1 and hence we have
∫ ∞
0
Pr(ei(s;Y˜ ) ≥ t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(ei(s;Y ) ≥ t)dt. (7)
Therefore, Eq. (6) must hold with equality for all ε ≥ 0 which in turn implies
DKL(PY˜ |s‖PY˜ ) = DKL(PY |s‖PY ). (8)
However, according to data processing inequality for KL divergence, Eq. (8) cannot hold true in
general. Therefore, there must exist some ε for which (6) does not hold. For more details about
this construction, see [47].
Next, we propose another metric in terms of a certain f -divergence, the so-called Eγ-divergence,
and show that it implies (5) while being immune to post-processing.
2.2 Eγ-Divergence
To address the issue raised above, we resort to a particular divergence metric between two prob-
ability distributions called Eγ-divergence, and show that this divergence bounds an appropriately
weighted tail distributions of i(s;Y ).
Definition 3 (Eγ-Divergence [48]). Given two probability distributions P and Q defined on the
same support set A and γ ≥ 1, we define Eγ-divergence as
Eγ(P‖Q) , sup
A⊂A
P (A)− γQ(A) (9)
=
∫
a∈A
(dP (a)− γdQ(a))+, (10)
where the equality comes from the fact that the optimizer in (9) is A∗ = {a ∈ A|P (a)−γQ(a) ≥ 0}.
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Eγ-divergence has been considered in various fields; for example, it appears in DP literature as
an equivalent definition for differentially private mechanisms (see e.g, [49, 50]), in statistics as the
probability of correct decision in Bayesian binary hypothesis testing [48], and in information theory
for proving general channel coding converse results [48,51].
Notice that Eγ(P‖Q) ≤ 1 for all γ ≥ 1 and any pair of distributions (P,Q). It is clear that the
constraint Eγ(PY ‖PY |s) ≤ δ for some δ ∈ (0, 1) ensures that PY (A)− γPY |s(A) ≤ δ for all subsets
A ⊂ X and in particular PY (A∗) ≤ δ. Since for γ = eε, the set A∗ corresponds to the tail events
of the random variable i(Y ; s), we henceforth assume γ = eε. Note also that to have control on
both tail events {i(Y ; s) < −ε} and {i(Y ; s) > ε}, we need to consider both Eeε(PY ‖PY |s) ≤ δ and
Eeε(PY |s‖PY ) ≤ δ. In the sequel, we present our results only for Eeε(PY |s‖PY ) ≤ δ. The results for
the reversed divergence can be derived mutatis mutandis.
Having this divergence at our disposal, we can now propose obfuscation criteria for the mech-
anisms {Mj}. As before, if xj /∈ Bεj (xj−1), we set Mj(xj) = xj ; otherwise, we shall construct
randomized mechanism Mj : X → X such that Mj(xj) = Yj satisfies
Eeε(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) ≤
δ
m
, (11)
where yj−1 is a realizations of all previous mechanisms M1(x1), . . . ,Mj−1(xj−1). The factor 1m in
the right-hand side of (11) is only for the sake of normalization (to be clarified in Theorem 2).
It is clear from (9) that upper bounds on Eγ(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) directly translate into low-
leakage guarantee (5). Furthermore, since Eγ-divergence belongs to the family of f -divergences [52],
it satisfies the data processing inequality which in turn implies that mechanisms satisfying (11) are
immune to post-processing.
To even further justify the choice of Eγ-divergence as a “proxy” for the obfuscation metric in
(5), we prove in the following theorem an equivalent formula for Eeε(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) in terms
of the tail distribution Pr(i(s;Yj |yj−1) > t) for t ≥ 0.
Theorem 1 (Tail Distribution Formula). Given distributions PYj |s,yj−1 and PYj |yj−1 , we have
Eeε(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) = eε
∫ ∞
ε
e−t Pr(i(s;Yj |yj−1) > t)dt. (12)
This result provides an operational interpretation for Eγ-divergence for our obfuscation setting.
More precisely, Eeε(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) ≤ δ enforces the events {i(Y ; s) > t} to have small aggregate
(weighted) probability for all t ≥ ε.
Next, we address the composition property of the above mechanisms: If each mechanism Mj
satisfies (11), then so does the composed mechanismM = (M1, . . . ,Mm) with parameters mε and
δ. Recall that Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) is the output of the mechanism M.
Theorem 2 (Composition). For all mechanismsMj , j ∈ [m] satisfying (11), we have for all s ∈ S
Eemε(PY |s‖PY ) ≤ δ. (13)
This theorem states that a guarantee for each feature, given by (11), will result in a mean-
ingful guarantee for the whole sample. This, in particular, demonstrates the need for conditional
information density in Definition 2, as opposed to the unconditional one.
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2.3 A Gaussian Obfuscation Mechanism
We next give an explicit construction of mechanisms {Mj} satisfying (11). Here, we assume that
each feature xj ∈ C where C is a compact subset of Rr. Recall that each mechanism Mj is
required to generate Yj satisfying (11). As a simple approach to enforce this guarantee, we propose
the additive Gaussian mechanism; that is, for each given j ∈ [m], ε, and xj−1 ∈ X j−1, we consider
the following mechanism
Yj = xj + λ1{xj∈Bεj (xj−1)}N, (14)
where N is an independent standard Gaussian noise N (0, Ir×r) and λ > 0 is determined according
to the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Gaussian Obfuscation). The Gaussian obfuscation mechanism (14) satisfies (11) if λ
satisfies
θeε(K,λ) ≤ δ
m
, (15)
where K is the radius of C, i.e., K = maxw∈C‖w‖, and for any a > 0
θeε(a, λ) , Q
(
λε
a
− a
2λ
)
− eεQ
(
λε
a
+
a
2λ
)
, (16)
where Q(v) = Pr(N (0, 1) ≥ v) = ∫∞v 1√2pie−t2/2dt.
In light of this theorem, if ε ≈ 0, then the noise variance λ must be of order O( K− log(1− δ
m
)
). The
exact value of noise variance, however, cannot be derived as there is no analytic expression for the
Q function.
We have thus far made the information-theoretic assumption that the underlying distribution
PS,X is given and, consequently, the information density is known exactly. In the following section,
we propose a data-driven estimator for information density which renders our proposed mechanism
applicable to real-world datasets.
3 Trimmed Information Density
The obfuscation mechanism in Section 2 relies on the conditional information density i(s;xj |xj−1)
to identify the set of information-leaking. Notice that, since information density satisfies the chain
rule, i.e.
i(s;xj |xj−1) = i(s;xj)− i(s;xj−1), (17)
an estimate of i(s;xj |xj−1) can be constructed by estimates of i(s;xj) and i(s;xj−1).
In general, exact estimation of the information density is hard due to its unboundeness. How-
ever, we do not need the exact estimation; instead, we only need to know if the absolute value of
the conditional information density is larger than the threshold ε (Definition 2). In other words,
estimating the trimmed information density is sufficient for obfuscation purposes. Moreover, the
tail of the information density satisfies [48]
Pr
{
i(s;Xj) > t
} ≤ e−t, ∀s, (18)
indicating that the estimation error caused by trimming the information densities can be controlled.
In this section, we propose a consistent and scalable estimator for the trimmed information density,
called the TIDE, and show that estimating the trimmed information density can be easier than
estimating the exact information density in terms of sample complexity.
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3.1 Trimmed Information Density Estimator
TIDE is based on a variational representation of KL divergence1 known as the Donsker-Varadhan
(DV) representation [53], given by
DKL(PS,X‖PSPX) = sup
g:S×X→R
{EPS,X [g(S,X)]− logEPSPX [eg(S,X)]}. (19)
Recall that DKL(PS,X‖PSPX) is equal to the mutual information I(S;X) between S and X, which
is in fact the expected information density EPS,X [i(S,X)]. It can be shown that the maximizer g∗
of (19) is exactly the information density, i.e., g∗(s, x) = i(s;x). Hence, the problem of estimating
information density is equivalent to solving the functional optimization problem (19) given access
to samples drawn from PS,X .
Since the search space in (19) is unconstrained, directly solving the optimization by computing
the empirical expectations would fail in general. One practical approach is to restrict the search
space to a family G(Θ) of continuous and bounded functions gθ parameterized by θ in a compact
domain Θ ⊂ Rd, where d is the number of parameters. The new constrained optimization prob-
lem corresponds to approximating the information density by a bounded function, thus the name
trimmed information density.
The TIDE is then given by
gˆn , argmax
gθ∈G(Θ)
{EPSn,Xn [gθ(S,X)]− logEPSnPXn [egθ(S,X)]}, (20)
where PSn,Xn and PSnPXn denote the empirical distributions of PS,X and PSPX by n samples,
respectively.
3.2 Consistency and Sample Complexity
The TIDE obtained by solving (20) belongs to a broader class of extremum estimators [54] of the
form aˆ = argmaxa∈A Λn(a), where Λn(a) is an objective function and A is a parameter space.
The consistency of extremum estimators is guaranteed by the Newey-McFadden Lemma [55] (cf.
Supplementary Material), which in turn implies the consistency of the TIDE, as stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Consistency). If G(Θ) is the family of continuous and bounded functions parame-
terized by θ taking values in a compact domain Θ, then the TIDE (20) is consistent, i.e., for any
η > 0, there exist N > 0 such that for all n > N , we have |gˆn(s, x)− g∗(s, x)|≤ η with probability
one for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X .
We turn our attention to deriving the sample complexity of the TIDE. We make further as-
sumption that functions in G(Θ) are Lipschitz, and use (18) to prove the following theorem. To
avoid technical complications, we assume that EPS,X [g(S,X)] and EPSPX [eg(S,X)] are finite for all
functions g in G(Θ).
Theorem 5 (Sample Complexity). Assume that functions in G(Θ) are bounded by M and Lipschitz
with respect to θ, and Θ ⊂ Rd is compact. Then we have |gˆn(s, x)− g∗(s, x)|≤ η with probability
at least 1− e−M , for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X , where n = O(M3d
η2
).
1Other f -divergences [20,52] could also be used, see the Supplementary Material for more details.
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Observe that trimming the information density is crucial for the bound in the previous theorem
to hold: if M → ∞ (i.e., estimating the exact information density), the sample complexity of
the TIDE grows to infinity and the result is vacuous. In fact, we need to restrict the search
space to all continuous and bounded functions G to exactly approximate the trimmed information
density. However, for computational reason, we assume that these functions can be parameterized
by a compact domain Θ, and the complexity of the family G(Θ) is characterized by its number of
parameters d. As the complexity of the functions d → ∞, meaning the search space is too large,
the sample complexity goes to infinty. This assumption allows us to approximate the functions in
G(Θ) by neural networks, where Θ is the weights in all layers, as we will see next.
3.3 Implementation
In practice, we use the set of functions representable by a neural network with output clipped to
[−M,M ] to approximate the set of continuous and bounded functions g(s, x) in G. By sampling
(s, x) from PS,X and from PS × PX for the first and second expectations in (20), we can fit the
neural network. After training, the g(s, x) outputs the estimate of the trimmed information density
of samples |i(s;x)|≤ M . In order to reconstruct the conditional information density by the chain
rule (17), we compute g(s, xj) for i(s, xj) and g(s, xj−1) for i(s, xj−1); then the i(s, xj)− i(s, xj−1)
gives the desired conditional information density |i(s;xj |xj−1)|≤ 2M .
4 Experiments
The experiments contain two parts. First, we investigate image obfuscation [28–30] as a common
use case of our approach with the GENKI-4k [31] and Celeberity Attributes [32] datasets. Sec-
ond, we demonstrate how TIDE can be possibly used to discover politically-charged terms in the
Tweets of online media [33]. Detailed experimental setups (e.g., architecture of the function g in
TIDE, training details) and additional experiments on Gaussian synthetic data are provided in the
Supplementary Material.
4.1 Image Obfuscation
A common application of information obfuscation is image obfuscation [28–30], where we aim to
hide information related to a given sensitive attribute in an image. Unlike existing works which rely
on neural networks to select and perturb features [1,28], we apply the TIDE to identify information-
leaking features for the Gaussian obfuscation mechanism (Section 2). We split x into a grid, where
each “patch” of size p×p pixels in the grid represents the low-level features xj of the image x. It is
a common method to extract low-level features in an image [28]. We number each xj in an image
from the upper-left corner to the lower-right, and use the TIDE (with M = 3) to determine the
information-leaking features by (4), and demonstrate our obfuscation approach on two datasets:
the GENKI-4k and Celeberity Attributes datasets.
4.1.1 GENKI-4K Dataset
This dataset contains 2400 images for training and 600 for testing, where each image x is a 64× 64
pixels face that has emotion smiling (s = 1) or not (s = 0). We select 10 faces for illustration in
Figure 1. When the patch size is 32× 32 (4 patches), the TIDE simply flags the lower two patches
to be information-leaking. As the patch becomes finer, the information-leaking patches concentrate
to the mouse area; thus when applying the Gaussian obfuscation mechanism, it is visually possible
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Figure 1: Row (a) shows original images. Rows (b), (c) and (d) show the information-leaking patches found by the
TIDE (20) with patch sizes 32 × 32, 8 × 8 and 2 × 2 pixels respectively (color red indicates higher value). Row (e)
shows the Gaussian obfuscation mechanism (14) on row (d) with ε = 0.5 and λ = 1.0, which successfully hide the
sensitive attribute of emotion. The information-leaking patches is easy to interpret: the TIDE focuses more on the
mouth area as the patches become finer.
Table 1: Classification accuracy of emotion obfuscation for the GENKI-4k dataset with different patch sizes p× p
and threshold ε. Results on obfuscating the lower-half image by Gaussian noise (LHI) and on random guessing are
shown as comparison.
Classification Accuracy %
p× p
ε
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 ∞
32× 32 50.54 50.54 92.04 92.04 92.04
16× 16 50.72 51.46 79.14 89.52 92.04
8× 8 50.93 68.94 78.71 87.33 92.04
4× 4 50.60 65.06 75.23 83.89 92.04
2× 2 50.64 62.25 68.59 80.26 92.04
LHI 50.58 - - - -
Guess 50.41 - - - -
to identify the gender of the subject but with their emotion obfuscated. The leakage guarantee in
Theorem 3, δ/m ≈ 0.24, can be computed by (16) with ε = 0.5 and K = 1 since the images are
normalized. Note that the TIDE can not only reveal the patches informative of emotion, but also
captures the contour of faces.
We train an adversary that can classify the emotion of the subject with accuracy 92.04%, and
report the classification accuracy of the Gaussian obfuscation mechanism (λ = 1 in (14)) under
different patch sizes and threshold ε in Table 1. When ε = ∞ (i.e. Bεj (xj−1) = φ for all j), no
patch is identified by the TIDE, and therefore the performances are the same as the adversary. A
simple mechanism to hide the emotion in images is adding Gaussian noise onto the Lower Half of
the Image (LHI). As a comparison, the results of LHI and random guessing are also included in
Table 1. The LHI gives similar performance when the patch size is 32× 32 since when ε = 0.5, the
lower two patches of the image will be identified as information-leaking for the mechanism (Figure 1
row (b)), but LHI will erase too much information that is not related to the emotion. The random
guessing values correspond the to prior distribution of the emotion labels in the training set.
4.1.2 Celebrity Attributes (CelebA) Dataset
This more challenging dataset contains 202599 colorful high-resolution images, where each image
is a 218 × 178-pixel face image of a celebrity with 40 distinct binary labels, including smiling,
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Figure 2: Row (a) shows original images. Row (b) shows the information-leaking patches with size 2 × 2 by the
TIDE (color red indicates higher value). Row (c) shows the Gaussian obfuscation mechanism on row (b) with ε = 0.74
and λ = 1, and row (d) shows information obfuscation in [1] with the sensitive information budget equal to 0.72 bits.
Table 2: Comparison between our approach (with patch size 2 × 2) and [1] ( here stands for the tolerance of
sensitive information leak) on emotion and gender classification accuracy for the CelebA dataset.
Classification Accuracy %
Threshold Our approach Method in [1]
ε Emotion Gender Emotion Gender
∞ 92.04 94.29 92.04 94.29
0.8 85.97 91.48 85.59 92.53
0.7 75.15 90.39 76.40 91.20
0.6 71.33 87.61 70.88 89.77
0.5 69.01 86.97 68.60 89.47
LHI 53.91 69.35 53.91 69.35
Guess 51.79 58.32 51.79 58.32
gender, Arched Eyebrows, etc. We select 100k images as X and the sensitive attribute S to be
emotion as well for training the TIDE. In Figure 2, we randomly pick 4 images for illustration.
Given a small patch size, the Gaussian obfuscation mechanism (λ = 1 in (14)) perturbs selective
patches to hide the sensitive attribute while keeping other useful information (e.g. gender) intact.
The leakage guarantee (Theorem 3), δ/m ≈ 0.18, can be computed by (16) with ε = 0.74 and
K = 1. In Figure 2 row (d), we reproduce the method by [1] since it is the state-of-the-art result in
information obfuscation and its implementation is publicly available. The main difference between
our approach and [1] is that [1] requires an additionally pre-specified utility (i.e. the labels of
gender), while our approach does not require such labels. As we can see, both methods shown in
Figure 2 rows (c) and (d) obfuscate the mouth and some other area. However, our approach tends
to obfuscate less of the subject’s face.
We train two classifiers for emotion and gender, and report the accuracy of our approach and [1]
in Table 2. Both methods block emotion recognition, effectively pushing the accuracy of the emotion
classifier towards random guessing. More importantly, the gender classifier still performs well over
the sanitized images.
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Figure 3: i(s;xj |xj−1) for terms in Tweets. GOP: Grand Old Party (i.e. the Republican Party), NRA: National
Rifle Association, EO: Entrepreneurs’ Organization, Euromaidan Pr.: Euromaidan Press.
4.2 Information-Leaking Terms in Tweets
Finally, we showcase how the TIDE can be used in natural language to identify politically-charged
terms in the Tweets from online media [33]. The information density is called the pointwise mutual
information (PMI) in natural language processing to measure associations between words and
labels [56]. Since perturbation on languages is not yet well-defined [57], we do not perform the
mechanism in (14), but focus on identifying information-leaking terms.
We collect N = 75946 Tweets from more than 20 online publishers (e.g. CNN, Bloomberg,
New York Times), and determine their private attribute S as the political preference of being
right-wing (s = 0) and left-wing (s = 1) according to [33], where the numbers of samples with
each political bias are equivalent. We pre-process the Tweets to keep only meaningful terms (i.e.
pieces of words) and use bag-of-words representation [58] to tokenize all the pieces of words for each
Tweet according to term frequency, ending up with 24657 terms (i.e. features xj , j ∈ [24657]). We
train the TIDE using the tokenized Tweets as x. In Figure 3, we show the estimate of trimmed
conditional information density i(s;xj |xj−1) of each term. It is clear that some terms carry more
information about the political bias. For instance, terms such as “Grand Old Party” and “National
Rifle Association” associate with right-wing politics, and terms “Europe” and “liberal(s)” with the
left. In this scenario, our approach could be eventually deployed as a plug-in to warn the users
about potential political preference leaks before posting Tweets.
5 Final Remarks
We introduced a new information obfuscation framework that first identifies information-leaking
features using the trimmed information density, and then tailors the obfuscation mechanism only
on these features. To our knowledge, this framework is the first formal application of information
density to quantify information-leaking features, and could potentially serve as a data-driven tool
for designing obfuscation mechanism for high-dimensional data.
Limitations. In order to estimate the information density, we make two key assumptions: (i)
we know a priori sensitive attributes that we wish to hide (e.g., political preference), and (ii) we
have access to a reference dataset from which we can fit the TIDE (though this is difficult to
avoid as discussed in [59]). Although these assumptions are restrictive in practice, they allow us to
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develop systematic machinery to discover information-leaking samples and features in an entirely
data-driven manner.
Here, we give proofs of theorems and other technical discussions omitted from Sections 2 and 3
and also provide further details about the experiment setups and also the training phase.
A Proofs and Theoretical Backgrounds
In this section, we provide proofs omitted in the main text, as well as some discussions on the
relationship between the TIDE and variational representations of f divergences and the Newey-
McFadden lemma.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For notational brevity, we drop yj−1 from the conditioning part of PYj |s,yj−1 and PYj |yj−1 and also
write P and Q for PYj |s and PYj , respectively. To prove this theorem, note that according to
Definition 3, we can write
Eeε(P‖Q) = P (i(s;Yj) > ε)− eεQ(i(s;Yj) > ε).
Hence, letting C denote the tail event {y : i(s; y) > ε} for a given s, we have
Eeε(P‖Q) = P (C)− eεQ(C)
= EP
[
1{Yj∈C}
]
− eεEQ
[
1{Yj∈C}
]
(a)
= EQ
[
ei(s;Yj)1{Yj∈C}
]
− eεEQ
[
1{Yj∈C}
]
= EQ
[(
ei(s;Yj) − eε
)
1{Yj∈C}
]
= EQ
[(
ei(s;Yj) − eε
)
+
]
= EQ
[
ei(s;Yj)e−i(s;Yj)
(
ei(s;Yj) − eε
)
+
]
(b)
= EP
[(
1− eεe−i(s;Yj)
)
+
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
((
1− eε−i(s;Yj)
)
1{Yj∈C} ≥ t
)
dt,
where both (a) and (b) follow from the simple change-of-variable argument EP
[
f(Y )
]
= EQ
[
ei(s;Yj)f(Y )
]
for any function f .
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Furthermore, since
(
1− eε−i(s;Yj)
)
1{i(s;Yj)>ε} < 1 with probability one, we have
Eeε(P‖Q) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr
((
1− eε−i(s;Yj)
)
1{Yj∈C} ≥ t
)
dt
=
∫ 1
0
Pr
((
1− eε−i(s;Yj)
)
1{Yj∈C} ≥ t
)
dt
=
∫ 1
0
Pr
(
1− eε−i(s;Yj) ≥ t
)
dt
=
∫ 1
0
Pr
(
e−i(s;Yj) ≤ (1− t)e−ε
)
dt
= eε
∫ e−ε
0
Pr
(
e−i(s;Yj) ≤ b
)
db
= eε
∫ ∞
ε
e−t Pr
(
i(s;Yj) ≥ t
)
dt.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
First assume that m = 2. For any set A ⊂ X 2 and s ∈ S, we have
PY1Y2|s(A) =
∑
y1∈X
PY1|s(y1) Pr((y1, Y2) ∈ A|s)
≤
∑
y1∈X
PY1|s(y1) min
{
1, eε Pr((y1, Y2) ∈ A) + δ′
}
≤
∑
y1∈X
PY1|s(y1) min
{
1, eε Pr((y1, Y2) ∈ A)
}
+ δ′
≤
∑
y1∈X
(
eεPY1(y1) + ζ(y1)
)
min
{
1, eε Pr((y1, Y2) ∈ A)
}
+ δ′
≤
∑
y1∈X
eεPY1(y1) min
{
1, eε Pr((y1, Y2) ∈ A)
}
+
∑
y1∈X
ζ(y1) + δ
′
≤ e2ε
∑
y1∈X
PY1(y1) Pr((y1, Y2) ∈ A) +
∑
y1∈X
ζ(y1) + δ
′
≤ e2εPY1Y2(A) +
∑
y1∈X
ζ(y1) + δ
′
= e2εPY1Y2(A) + Eeε(PY1|s‖PY1) + δ′
≤ e2εPY1Y2(A) + 2δ′
where δ′ = δ2 and ζ(a) :=
(
PY1|s(a)− eεPY1(a)
)
+
for any a ∈ X . The last step follows from the
fact that Eγ(P‖Q) =
∑
a∈X (P (a)− γQ(a))+. Consequently, we obtain that
PY1Y2|s(A) ≤ e2εPY1Y2(A) + δ,
for any set A ⊂ X 2 for m = 2. Repeating this argument (m− 1) times, we can write
PY |s(A) ≤ emεPY (A) + δ,
for any set A ⊂ Xm and s ∈ S from which we conclude
Eeε(PY |s‖PY ) ≤ δ.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
For any γ ≥ 1 and yj−1 ∈ X j−1, we have
Eγ(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) ≤ sup
xj−1
Eγ(PYj |s,xj−1,yj−1‖PYj |xj−1,yj−1)
= sup
xj−1
Eγ(PYj |s,xj−1‖PYj |xj−1), (21)
where the inequality follows from the convexity of Eγ-divergence in each of its arguments (see,
e.g., [52]). Notice that for any given xj−1 ∈ X j−1, we can write (with an abuse of notation)
Eγ(PYj |s,xj−1‖PYj |xj−1) =
∫
B
[P (dxj |s, xj−1)N (xj , λ)− eεP (dxj |xj−1)N (xj , λ)]+
+
∫
Bc
[P (dxj |s, xj−1)− eεP (dxj |xj−1)]+
=
∫
B
[P (dxj |s, xj−1)N (xj , λ)− eεP (dxj |xj−1)N (xj , λ)]+
where we use B and Bc to write Bεj (x
j−1) and its complement. This demonstrates that the mass
points corresponding to the event Bc do not contribute in the Eγ-divergence.
Letting P = PXj |s,xj−1 and Q = PXj |xj−1 for a given x
j−1, it follows from above that
sup
xj−1
Eγ(PYj |s,xj−1‖PYj |xj−1) ≤ Eγ(P ∗ N (0, λ)‖Q ∗ N (0, λ)) = E
[
Eγ(N (A, λ))‖N (B, λ)
]
, (22)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator and A ∼ P and B ∼ Q and the expectation is taken over
any arbitrary coupling of P and Q (e.g., their product). It can be shown that
Eγ(N (µ1, λ2Ir)‖N (µ2, λ2Ir)) = Q
(
log γ
β
− 1
2
β
)
− γQ
(
log γ
β
+
1
2
β
)
, (23)
where Q(v) = Pr(N (0, 1) ≥ v) = ∫∞v 1√2pie−t2/2dt and β = ‖µ1−µ2‖λ . Notice that the Eγ-divergence
between two Gaussian distributions depends on their means only through their differences.
θγ(a, λ) , Eγ(N (µ, λ2Ir)‖N (0, λ2Ir)),
where ‖µ‖= a. According to (22), we can now write
sup
xj−1
Eγ(PYj |s,xj−1‖PYj |xj−1) ≤ sup
a∈C
θγ(‖a‖, λ) = θγ(K,λ),
where the equality is due to the fact that a 7→ θγ(a, λ) is increasing for a fixed λ. This, together
with (21), implies
Eγ(PYj |s,yj−1‖PYj |yj−1) ≤ θγ(K,λ),
and hence (14) is satisfied if θeε(K,λ) ≤ δm .
A.4 Estimating Information Density using f-Divergences
Other f -divergence measures could also be used to estimate the information density by leverag-
ing their dual representation [27]. Given a convex function f with f(1) = 0, the f -divergence
Df (P‖Q) = EQf
(
P
Q
)
can be expressed as
Df (P‖Q) = sup
g:X→R
EP [g(X)]− EQ[f∗(g(X))], (24)
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where f∗(t) , supx∈R{xt − f(t)} is the Fenchel convex conjugate of f . It can be shown that the
optimizer is the subdifferential ∂f(PQ) which, in turn, is a non-decreasing function of
P
Q . Thus,
Df (P‖Q) is also a candidate loss function in density ratio estimation problems.
A.5 Newey-McFadden Lemma
Lemma 1 ( [55, Theorem 2.1]). Given the extremum estimator aˆ = argmaxa∈A Λn(a), if (i) A is
compact; (ii) there exists a limiting function Λ(a) such that Λn(a) converges to Λ(a) in probability
over A; (iii) Λ(a) is continuous and has unique maximum at a = a∗, then aˆ is a consistent estimator
of a∗.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Let the objective function of the extremum estimator be
Λn(g) , EPSn,Xn [g(S,X)]− logEPSnPXn [eg(S,X)]. (25)
We prove this theorem by checking the properties of Λn(g) according to Lemma 1. First, since
Θ is compact and the mappings gθ are continuous, the images G(Θ) is also compact. Second, by
triangular inequality, for g ∈ G(Θ), we have
|Λn(g)− (EPS,X [g(S,X)]− logEpSpX [eg(S,X)])|
≤ sup
g∈G(Θ)
|EPS,X [g(S,X)]− EPSn,Xn [g(S,X)]|
+ sup
g∈G(Θ)
|logEPSPX [g(S,X)]− logEPSnPXn [g(S,X)]|.
(26)
Since the function g is uniformly bounded by M , i.e. |g|≤ M for all θ, s and x, and logarithm is
Lipschitz continuous with constant eM in the interval [e−M , eM ], we have
|logEPSPX [g(S,X)]− logEPSnPXn [g(S,X)]|≤ eM |EPSPX [g(S,X)]− EPSnPXn [g(S,X)]|. (27)
Moreover, since G is compact and g is continuous, the functions g and eg satisfy the uniform law
of large numbers [60]. Thus, Given η > 0, there exists an integer N such that for all n ≥ N and
with probability one,
sup
g∈G(Θ)
|EPS,X [g(S,X)]− EPSn,Xn [g(S,X)]|≤
η
2
, (28)
and
sup
g∈G(Θ)
|logEPSPX [g(S,X)]− logEPSnPXn [g(S,X)]|≤
η
2
e−M . (29)
Summarizing (26)-(29), we have with probability one
|Λn(g)− (EPS,X [g(S,X)]− logEPSPX [eg(S,X)])|≤ η. (30)
In other words, there exists a limiting function Λ(g) = EPS,X [g(S,X)] − logEPSPX [eg(S,X)] such
that Λn(g) converges to Λ(g) in probability.
Third, since Λ(g) = EPS,X [g(S,X)]− logEPSPX [eg(S,X)] consists of linear combinations (expec-
tations) and continuous mappings (logarithm and exponential) of the continuous function g, Λ(g)
is continuous. Moreover, Λ(g) has a unique optimizer g∗. Therefore, by Lemma 1, we know that
with probability one,
|gˆn(s, x)− gˆθ(s, x)|≤ η, ∀s ∈ S, x ∈ X , (31)
giving the consistency of the information density estimator.
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 5
By Hoeffding’s inequality [61], for all functions g bounded by M , i.e. |g|≤M , we have
Pr{|EPSn,Xn [g(S,X)]− EPS,X [g(S,X)]|>
η
4
} ≤ 2 exp
(
−2n
2(η2 )
2
(2M)2n
)
= 2 exp
(
− nη
2
32M2
)
. (32)
Moreover, since gθ is parameterized by θ, we utilize the union bound [62, Lemma 2.2] to extend
(32) for the parameters θ. For this purpose, recall that Θ ⊂ Rd is compact and bounded by C, by
the exterior covering number of bounded subspace [62, pp. 337], we know the r-covering number
N(r,Θ) of Θ is upper bounded by
N(r,Θ) ≤
(
2C
√
d
r
)d
. (33)
By (32) and (33), we have
Pr{∃θl ∈ Θ s.t. sup
gθ
|EPSn,Xn [gθl(S,X)]− EPS,X [gθl(S,X)]|>
η
4
} ≤ 2N(r,Θ) exp
(
− nη
2
32M2
)
. (34)
where θl is in the r-cover of Θ. Since G(Θ) is compact, we can replace the supremum by maximum.
To make 2N(r,Θ) exp
(
− nη2
32M2
)
< δ, we have
n >
32M2(logN(r,Θ) + log 2δ )
η2
. (35)
Now, let r = η8L , and recall that gθ is L-Lipschitz continuous with respect to θ, then for any θ ∈ Θ,
we have with probability one
|gθ − gθl |≤ L|θ − θl|≤ Lr = L×
η
8L
=
η
8
. (36)
By triangular inequality, for any θ ∈ Θ, whenever n > 32M
2(d log 16LC
√
d
η
+log 2
δ
)
η2
, we have with proba-
bility at least 1− δ,
max
gθ
|EPSn,Xn [gθ(S,X)]− EPS,X [gθ(S,X)]|≤maxgθ |EPSn,Xn [gθ(S,X)]− EPSn,Xn [gθl(S,X)]|
+ max
gθ
|EPSn,Xn [gθl(S,X)]− EPS,X [gθl(S,X)]|
+ max
gθ
|EPS,X [gθ(S,X)]− EPS,X [gθl(S,X)]|
≤η
8
+
η
4
+
η
8
=
η
2
(37)
Therefore, we have
Pr{max
gθ
|EPSn,Xn [gθ(S,X)]− EPS,X [gθ(S,X)]|≤
η
2
} ≥ 1− δ. (38)
Similarly, starting from
Pr{∃θl ∈ Θ s.t. |logEPSnPXn [egθl (S,X)]− logEPSPX [egθl (S,X)]|≥
η
4
}
≤2N(r,Θ) exp
(
− nη
2
32M2
)
,
(39)
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we also conclude that for any θ ∈ Θ, whenever n > 32M
2(d log 16LC
√
d
η
+log 2
δ
)
η2
, we have with probability
at least 1− δ,
Pr{max
gθ
|logEPSn,Xn [Egθ(S,X)]− logEPS,X [egθ(S,X)]|≤
η
2
} ≥ 1− δ. (40)
Summarizing (38) and (40), whenever n >
32M2(d log 16LC
√
d
η
+log 2
δ
)
η2
, for any θ ∈ Θ, we have
Pr{|max Λn(gˆn(s, x))−max Λ(g(s, x))|≤ η}
≥Pr{max
gθ
|EPSn,Xn [gθ(S,X)]− EPS,X [gθ(S,X)]|+ maxgθ |logEPSn,Xn [E
gθ(S,X)]
− logEPS,X [egθ(S,X)]|≤ η}
≥1− δ.
(41)
The trimmed information density estimator, in this sense, gives a trimmed (clipped) information
density, i.e. |gˆn(s, x) − g∗(s, x)|≤ η if g∗(s, x) ≤ M and |gˆn(s, x) − g∗(s, x)|≥ η otherwise. By the
concentration of the information density [63], we also know the probability that the information
density is clipped is upper bounded, i.e.
Pr{|g∗(s, x)|≥M} ≤ e−M . (42)
Therefore, whenever n >
32M2(d log 16LC
√
d
η
+log 2
δ
)
η2
, for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X , we have
Pr{|gˆn(s, x)− g∗(s, x)|≤ η} ≥ 1− δ ≥ 1− e−M , (43)
by choosing δ ≤ e−M , and the desire result follows.
B Experimental Details
In this section, we provide detailed experimental setups including architecture of the function g in
TIDE, training details for the experiments shown in the main text.
B.1 GENKI-4K Smiling Dataset
The GENKI-4K smiling dataset [31] contains 2400 colorful images for training and 600 for test,
where each image, viewed as X, is a 64× 64 pixels face that is smiling (S = 1) or not (S = 0).
Since the inputs of the encoder TIDE are images, we use adopt a convolutional neural net with
three convolutional layers, two fully-connected layers, and a readout layer. The convolutional layers
have kernels with dimension (5, 5, 3, 64), (5, 5, 64, 64), and (3, 3, 64, 128) respectively. After flatting
the output of the third convolutional layer, we feed the output to two fully-connected layers with
384 and 192 neurons respectively. We train for 100 epochs using AdagradOptimizer with learning
rate 0.0001 and batch size 256, and achieve I(S,X) = 0.594 < H(S) = 1 bits.
The adversary we used here is also a convolutional neural net with identical structure as the
TIDE with the difference that the objective is the cross-entropy loss for classification, and is trained
for 150 epochs using AdagradOptimizer with learning rate 0.005 and batch size 256.
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Table 3: WMAE of the information density estimation on Gaussian synthetic data (M = 5).
Empirical Plug-In Estimator Kernel Density Estimator TIDE
d
ρ
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5
1 0.466 0.509 1.092 1.821 0.252 0.434 0.973 1.395 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.057
10 5.305 7.613 9.704 18.245 2.869 4.076 6.698 11.496 1.010 1.216 1.884 2.503
B.2 Celebrity Attributes (CelebA) Dataset
The CelebA dataset [32] contains 202599 colorful images, where each image is a 218 × 178 pixels
face of a celebrity with 40 distinct binary labels, including smiling, gender, Arched Eyebrows,
etc. We select 100000 face images as X and the private attribute S as smiling or not.
Since the inputs of the encoder TIDE are images, we use adopt a convolutional neural net
with five convolutional layers, two fully-connected layers, and a readout layer. The convolutional
layers have kernels with dimension (5, 5, 3, 64), (5, 5, 64, 64), (3, 3, 128, 128), (3, 3, 128, 128), and
(3, 3, 64, 128) respectively. After flatting the output of the third convolutional layer, we feed the
output to two fully-connected layers with 384 and 192 neurons respectively. We train for 100 epochs
using AdagradOptimizer with learning rate 0.005 and batch size 64, and achieve I(S,X) = 0.967 ≈
H(S) = 1 bits.
The adversaries we used for emotion and gender detection here are also convolutional neural nets
with identical structure as the TIDE with the difference that the objective is the cross-entropy loss
for classification. We train the adversaries for 300 epochs using AdagradOptimizer with learning
rate 0.001 and batch size 2000.
B.3 Politically-Biased Tweets
We collect 75946 tweets from more than 20 online publishers (e.g. CNN, Bloomberg, New York
Times) using the Twitter API, and determine its private attribute S as the political bias of being
right-wing (S = 0) and left-wing (S = 1) according to [33]. We clean up the tweets to only keep
meaningful terms (i.e. pieces of words), and use bag-of-words representation [58] to tokenize all the
pieces of words for each tweet according to term frequency, ending up with 24657 words (xj). We
order the xj by the order it appears in the training texts of the Tweets.
The TIDE is a simple feed-forward neural network consists of three hidden layers with ReLU
activation with 100 neurons for each hidden layer, and a readout layer with 32 neurons. We train
for 50 epochs using AdagradOptimizer with learning rate 0.005 and batch size 128, and achieve
I(S;X) = 0.645 bits.
C Additional Experiments on Synthetic Data
We apply the TIDE in Section 3 on Gaussian synthetic data to estimate the trimmed information
density with limited number of samples and M = 5. We consider two d-dimensional multivariate
standard Normal random variables S and X, with pairwise correlation corr(Si, Xj) = ρ1{i=j}, ρ ∈
(−1, 1), 1 ≤ i, j,≤ d. Since the KL divergence is invariant to continuous bijective transformations
of the considered variables, it is sufficient to consider S and X with standard Normal marginals.
We generate 3000 samples with 70% − 30% train-test split accordingly. The TIDE is a simple
feed-forward neural network consists of three hidden layers with ReLU activation with 100, 50, 50
neurons for each hidden layer, and a readout layer with 50 neurons. We jointly train over the entire
training set for 3000 epochs using AdagradOptimizer with learning rate 0.005.
19
We compare the plug-in estimator using empirical distributions (with 30 bins for quantiza-
tion), the Gaussian kernel density estimator [64], and the TIDE using 3k samples, and report the
Weighted Mean Absolute Error (WMAE) of the information density in Table 3, where the weights
are chosen as the ground true joint distributions and each number in the table is averaged over
10 repeated experiments. Note that since the Normal random variable is continuous, quantized
empirical distribution gives loose estimate. The kernel density estimator performs better than the
plug-in estimator but worse than the TIDE due to limited number of samples.
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